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to the House Select Committee on Intelligence 17 December 1975

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

By way of introduction, I believe it would be useful for me to describe the role of the Intelligence Community in monitoring Soviet compliance with strategic arms limitations agreements.

The role of intelligence is to monitor Soviet activities relating to the SALT agreements and to report the facts and assessments of them to that part of the National Security Council Structure—the Verification Panel—which is responsible for SALT. The judgments as to whether a violation may have occurred, however, are made by the NSC Verification Panel for consideration by the President.

The Director of Central Intelligence has overall responsibility for guidance to and supervision of all intelligence collection and analytical activities required in the monitoring and reporting process.

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In June 1972, the United States Intelligence Board established a Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations to serve as the focal point for this activity. The Steering Group is chaired by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The other members of the group are the CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Director of the Defense Agency, and the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. Its responsibilities include:

- -- the evaluation of the effectiveness of intelligence collection and analysis for monitoring;
- -- the preparation of periodic reports on the status of Soviet compliance; and
- -- the analysis of information related to

 possible violations of the SALT agreements

 or other anomalies.

In practice a working group of representatives from the Intelligence Community prepares the regular monitoring reports for review and approval of the Steering Group. When approved,

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they are forwarded by the Chairman of the Steering Group through the Director of Central Intelligence to some 20 policy level officials including those on the NSC Verification Panel.

Mr. Chairman, with this as background I would like to describe how intelligence related to compliance is handled by CIA prior to and, in some cases, concurrent with consideration by the USIB Steering Group. Information from collectors of intelligence is regularly passed to those intelligence analysts in the CIA who normally deal with a specific subject or activity. These analysts are familiar with the provisions of the arms control agreements and readily recognize Soviet activity related to compliance. They immediately report this activity to senior intelligence officials who, in some cases, decide to limit the distribution of these items by putting them in what is called a "hold status".

What is a "hold" item and why is certain intelligence information placed in this category?

A "hold" item is intelligence which is not included in normal intelligence publications but is given very limited dissemination to named recipients on a strict need-to-know basis. The recipients

of intelligence on "hold" items are determined by the subject matter, the sensitivity of the intelligence, and the source from which it was derived.

The withholding of an intelligence item from normal dissemination and publication is not new. An earlier example occurred in October 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. Given the extreme sensitivity of the information on Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba and the critical international situation that resulted from this activity, the intelligence on the missile build-up was shared with a very few named individuals in the Government.

Intelligence on SALT compliance is put into a "hold status" for three principal reasons:

- -- First, the meaning of new information may not be clear and its dissemination is limited awaiting further analysis or more definitive information.
- -- Second, there has been a growing rash of security leaks of highly sensitive intelligence

information. These leaks not only jeopardized on-going diplomatic negotiations but also created grave compromises of the extremely vulnerable and reliable sources of this intelligence.

-- Third, certain understandings were entered into by the United States and the Soviet Union.

One was technical to restrict most closely any public statements on subjects being actively discussed in the SALT negotiations, in diplomatic channels or by the Standing Consultative Commission concerning compliance.

The procedures for putting an intelligence item into "hold status" and disseminating this information are fairly simple.

-- Upon notification of the receipt of an item of information that may be of sufficient sensitivity to consider its being put into "hold status", I or my deputy consult with senior officials in the

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Defense Intelligence Agency. When appropriate, we recommended to the Director of Central Intelligence that the information be put in "hold status".

- -- The information then placed in "hold status" is withheld from all normal distribution channels.
- The CIA intelligence experts concerned with the subject matter, in consultation with representatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency, analyze the information and then prepare a memorandum reporting the item and discussing its intelligence significance.
- -- As a general rule, this memorandum is forwarded by the Director of Central Intelligence to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

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- -- The memorandum says that the item is being withheld temporarily from publication or further written dissemination.
- -- It also seeks his guidance on how this item is to be handled and on occasion also recommends when the item should be published.
- for National Security Affairs may include a request that additional designated officials in the Government be informed of the item, or give instructions on when it is to be released from "hold status". His advice on the disposition of "hold" items is usually provided orally.
- -- Once a decision has been made that the item may be published, it is usually handled as a routine item in intelligence publications.

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Who else is informed about "hold" items?

- Director of Central Intelligence to the
 Assistant to the President for National
 Security Affairs are sent to the Secretary
 of Defense, and the Director of the Defense
 Intelligence Agency. On some occasions
 the memorandum is also sent to the
 Director, INR, in the Department of State,
 or the fact that the item has been put in
 "hold status" is communicated to him
 orally.
- of Defense upon receipt of these "hold"
 memoranda that the Director, DIA, or his
 representative will brief the Secretary of
 Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
 of Staff, the Director of the Joint Staff,

Department of Defense SALT Task Force
Director, and the U.S. Deputy Commissioner
for the Standing Consultative Commission.
In some cases, Service Chiefs and Assistant
Chiefs of Staff for Intelligence also receive
the briefing.

- -- In the Department of State upon receipt of information on a "hold" item, the Director, INR, usually briefs the Deputy Secretary of State.
- -- Mr. Sydney Graybeal, U.S. Commissioner,
 Standing Consultative Commission, is informed
 orally of all "hold" items by the Chief of CIA's
 SALT Support Staff.
- On a number of occasions, the CIA Deputy

 Director for Science and Technology has briefed

 members of the Congress on these "hold" items.

In addition to informing those senior officials who really need to know the information being kept in "hold" channels, our procedures also ensure that those at the working level within the CIA are fully informed. For example, in the case of our most recent "hold" item, a total of some 75 individuals within the Agency were informed of this information. This number included, of course, the senior levels of CIA, as well as those responsible for ensuring that our publications were not inconsistent with the information on "hold status". More importantly, just over half of these individuals were intelligence officers who had direct and immediate responsibility for keeping informed and reporting on the subject matter of the "hold" item.

That completes my prepared statement. I will try to answer any questions which can be discussed at an unclassified level.